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Abstract Could neuroimaging evidence help us to
assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a
crime which we know that they committed? This
essay defends an affirmative answer to this question.
A range of standard objections to this high-tech
approach to assessing people’s responsibility is
considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light
and then reject a novel objection—an objection which
is only encountered when functional (rather than
structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s
responsibility.
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Roperv.Simmons[2005]
Christopher Simmons Murders Shirley Crook
1
In the early hours of the morning on September 9th,
1993 in St. Louis County, Missouri, a 17 year old
Christopher Simmons and his younger friend Charles
Benjamin broke into the home of Mrs Shirley Crook
who was asleep at the time. Simmons and Benjamin
burgled her home and they bound the now awakened
woman’s arms and legs with electric cable and leather
straps, covered her face with a towel and duct tape,
loaded her into the back of her own mini-van, and
drove to the nearby Castlewood State park where
Simmons threw her off a railway bridge and into the
Maramec River down below. Hours later Mrs.
Crook’s lifeless body was retrieved from the river
by fishermen, and the medical examiner determined
that drowning was the cause of her death.
That Christopher Simmons killed Shirley Crook is
not in dispute. His role in the crime was clearly
established in the investigations that followed, and
these investigations also revealed both the pre-
meditated nature of the crime (witnesses testified that
Simmons had talked about wanting to burgle and
murder someone for some time) and the fact that
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1 This case summary is compiled from several sources, and I
provide this single citation to avoid many repetitive citations.
The sources used were [1–4].immediately afterwards he felt not remorse or guilt
but pride and a sense of accomplishment (at school
later that day he bragged to his friends about the
murder which he had just committed).
Age, Mental Capacities and Three Problems
Associated with Individualized Behavioural
Assessments of Responsibility
However, although there is no doubt that Christopher
Simmons killed Shirley Crook, we may still legiti-
mately ask whether he is fully responsible for what he
did. The primary consideration which mitigates
against attributing full responsibility to him for this
crime
2 [5] is age-related—on at least some definitions
Simmons was still a minor when he committed the
crime, and since we normally suppose that minors are
less than fully responsible for what they do on
account of their immaturity, we may therefore also
be tempted by the suggestion that Simmons too was
not fully responsible for his crime. However, several
matters complicate the issue, and perhaps the most
germane is the fact that when he committed the crime
Simmons was an adolescent approaching adulthood,
which perhaps suggests an important disanalogy
between him and other minors that counts against
treating him as we would a younger child. Admittedly
though, age is a very rough guide to how mature a
person really is—some people mature a lot faster than
others—and so if responsibility is indeed a function of
maturity then perhaps the law should individually
assess people’s responsibility—when so much is at
stake (how severely Simmons will be punished) we
should surely aim for greater precision and accuracy!
One way to individually assess people’s responsi-
bility might look like this. Working under the
assumption that a person’s responsibility is a function
of such things as their cognitive and volitional
capacities—i.e. respectively, their capacity for making
sound moral judgments and their capacity for exer-
cising appropriate self-control
3—we could attempt to
gauge how responsible a person is by using the
following behavioural approach; for instance, we
could set them moral judgment tasks and self-control
challenges, watch how well they perform, and
presumably the better they perform at these tests the
greater will be their cognitive and volitional capaci-
ties. Alternatively, we could talk to others who know
them well—for instance, their family, friends, neigh-
bours, teachers and peers—in an effort to build up an
accurate picture of their cognitive and volitional
capacities from these people’s biographical accounts.
By using this behavioural approach we would be
trying to determine not just whether the person under
assessment can make moral judgments and whether
they can control themselves, but rather whether they
can make sound moral judgments and whether they
can appropriately control themselves. After all, what
matters for responsibility is not just that one can make
some moral judgments, but rather that one’s moral
judgments are sound, and as Susan Wolf points out,
for this to happen an agent must be “able to ‘track’ the
True and Good in her value judgments” ([12]:211;
also see [11]). One way to conceive of the point that
Wolf is making here is that in addition to the formal
requirements upon how one’s reason must operate in
order to be valid, there are also substantive require-
ments on the content of the premises from which one
reasons or which form the background assumptions
2 When I talk of “attributing responsibility to him for this
crime” my concern is with what might be called his outcome
responsibility (i.e. what states of affairs he brought about; e.g.
[5]:555), not with what Christopher Kutz and H.L.A. Hart refer
to as his liability responsibility (i.e. what we should do to him-,
how we should treat him-, how we should hold him
responsible-, or even how he should take responsibility for his
crime; [6]:211; [7]:549). To avoid equivocation, it is crucial to
keep a clear distinction between the many different senses of
the term “responsibility”, or what I elsewhere refer to as the
many different “responsibility concepts” ([8]:115), more of
which are briefly mentioned in the following footnote.
3 I suggest these particular capacities because of what seems to
me like an obvious link between maturity and responsibility—
presumably, this is at least part of the reason why maturity is
meant to be relevant to responsibility—but also because of the
prominence of these two mental conditions (or other closely
related conditions) in the relevant literature (e.g. [9–16]).
However, as I argue elsewhere—and I believe that others
would agree on this point (e.g. see [17]:71; [18]:38–9)—
responsibility does not just hinge on facts about a person’s
mental capacities (their capacity responsibility), since in the
least it probably also depends on such things as how they acted
and whether there was a connection between their action and
the outcome for which they are allegedly responsible (their
causal responsibility), whether in acting as they did they
violated their role responsibilities, and many other things such
as whether they are responsible for the fact that they now lack
those mental capacities ([19]:202–3).
36 N.A. Vincentthat inform one’s moral judgment—or what Neil Levy
refers to as “moral knowledge” [20]—since these
substantive issues also bear on whether one’s other-
wise flawless reasoning processes will be sufficient to
bestow upon one the status of a responsible moral
agent. Similarly, what matters for responsibility is not
just that one can control oneself in some way, but
rather that one can control oneself in the right way—
one way of putting this point is that one’s actions
must issue from a mechanism that is moderately
responsive to reasons [9].
4 Thus, what such a
behavioural approach would attempt to do is to
determine whether the person being tested can make
sound moral judgments (e.g. whether they are able to
give the right sorts of answers to moral questions and
whether one can justify those answers appropriately)
and whether they can appropriately control them-
selves (e.g. whether they are able to resist temptations
to do what they think should be resisted).
However, I see at least three problems with using
this behavioural approach to the individual assess-
ment of people’s responsibility. As regards the first
suggestion (i.e. administering tests), given that the
outcome of such a test may eventually bear on how
severely the person is punished, subjects would have
every reason to pretend that their capacities are a lot
lower than what they really are—i.e. they would have
every reason to intentionally flunk such tests by
giving the most ridiculous answers to the moral
judgment tasks and by yielding to even the weakest
of temptations, to make it seem as if their cognitive
and volitional capacities are severely retarded. As
regards the second suggestion (i.e. talking to people
who know them), given that their family and friends
may want to defend them and that their enemies may
want to see them perish, if what we wanted was an
accurate, precise and impartial method of gauging a
person’s responsibility then this would not be the best
alternative since there is simply too much opportunity
for everyone to lie about what the person whose
responsibility is being assessed is really like.
Most importantly though—and this point counts
against both of these suggestions on purely philosoph-
ical grounds—strictly speaking such tests are actually
incapable of revealing anything about what capacities a
person lacks (about what they cannot do). The mere
fact that someone has always acted badly—irrespective
of whether this is something that we ascertain from
repeated tests or from the stories that others tell about
them, and irrespective of whether this relates to their
moral judgment or to their self-control—may simply
only show that they are lazy rather than that they are
incapacitated—i.e. that they do not make the right
moral judgments rather than that they can not make the
right moral judgments, or that they do not control
themselves rather than that they can not control
themselves. For instance, Bernadette McSherry also
points out that “it is impossible to devise an objectively
verifiable test to determine when an accused could not
control him or herself and when he or she merely
would not” ([25]:188, emphasis added), and Robert
Sapolsky highlights this same point by drawing
attention to the difficulties associated with “distin-
guishing between an irresistible impulse and one that is
to any extent resistible but which was not resisted”
([13]:1790, emphasis added).
My point is that even if the stories told by others
revealed that Christopher Simmons had always
misbehaved ever since he was little, that would not
necessarily have shown that he couldn’t distinguish
right from wrong or that he couldn’t help acting that
way—as we all know, children often knowingly
misbehave, and hence such stories are perfectly
compatible with the possibility that Simmons pos-
sessed those capacities all along but that he simply
didn’t use them. Alternatively, even if repeated
behavioural tests show that Christopher Simmons
consistently makes the wrong moral judgments and
that he consistently yields to even the weakest of
temptations, this will not necessarily show that he
can’t distinguish right from wrong or that he can’t
control himself, since this behaviour can also be
explained by the alternative hypothesis that he simply
doesn’t use capacities which for all we know he does
actually possess; perhaps the reason why he acts
impulsively and why he doesn’t resist temptation is
because he is lazy (i.e. maybe he simply doesn’t try
hard enough).
This third problem is an instance of the so-called
modal fallacy in which certain types of conclusions
about what is possible are invalidly derived from
premises about what is actual—in this case, observa-
tions about what doesn’t occur (about a person’s
behaviour) are erroneously taken to entail conclusions
about what can’t occur (about their incapacity). Some
4 Alternatively, see [21] or one of [22–24] for concise
summaries of Fischer and Ravizza’s position.
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derived purely from premises about what is actual—
for instance, the fact that it is raining does entail that it
is possible that it is raining. However, in the case at
hand what we have is something more like this: the
fact that it is not raining entails that it is not possible
that it is raining; and this latter sort of derivation of a
conclusion about what is possible from a claim about
what is actual is patently invalid. Thus, quite apart
from the fact that the person being tested and that
others who tell us about them can deceive and lie, this
modal fallacy poses a serious philosophical problem
for using such behavioural approaches in the individ-
ual assessment of people’s responsibility.
Hence, for at least these three reasons—i.e. (1)
because people can pretend that their cognitive and
volitional capacities are impaired when in fact they
are fully intact, (2) because other people’s biograph-
ical accounts of what someone else is like may be
inaccurate, and (3) because of the modal fallacy that
was just described—I find such behavioural assess-
ments of responsibility wanting.
The Promise of Neuroimaging
However, neuroimaging may seem to offer us a better
solution—a high-tech way of individually assessing
people’s responsibility that does not run into these
three problems—by making it possible to directly
inspect people’s brains and to bypass the filter of their
own and of other people’s agendas. Speaking broadly
and schematically, and working yet again under the
earlier assumption that a person’s responsibility is
determined in part and amongst other things by what
responsibility-relevant capacities they possess, neuro-
imaging could conceivably help by first revealing
precisely which brain mechanisms are required for
responsible moral agency, and then by helping us to
check whether a specific individual whose responsi-
bility is in need of individual assessment possesses
those brain mechanisms. The basic idea here is
simple: to be a responsible moral agent one must
have the right mental capacities, but since mental
capacities are implemented in brain mechanisms (in
brain “hardware”), to be a responsible moral agent
one must have the right brain mechanisms, and that—
i.e. whether the person whose responsibility is being
assessed has those brain mechanisms—is precisely
what neuroimaging would be used for in this high-
tech approach to the individualized assessment of
responsibility.
5
Something like this is already being done in the
moral cognition literature, where researchers first try to
reveal which parts of the brain are used in various kinds
of moral judgment tasks, and this information can then
be used in attempts to shed light on why specific
individuals make queer moral judgments (e.g. see [26];
or the collection of articles introduced by [27]).
Similarly, it is conceivable that neuroimaging could
also be used to study the neural basis of moral
responsibility to determine what “common core of
mental capacities [a] person must have in order to be a
responsible or competent moral agent” ([19]:202,
emphasis removed) and then to use this knowledge to
help us individually assess specific people’sr e s p o n s i -
bility by checking whether they have those capacities or
not, except here our interests would be somewhat
broader than they are in the area of moral cognition if
only because moral responsibility hinges on volitional
as well as cognitive capacities. Although at present it is
not clear precisely which mental capacities are required
for responsible moral agency—for instance, whether a
capacity for rationality is all that is required (e.g. [18]),
or whether one must also have the right emotional/
affective capacities (e.g. [28]), or maybe even some
more finely-grained capacity that will be revealed in the
future by neuroimaging studies (e.g. [19]:203; [29])—
presumably, with the help of neuroimaging in the future
we will discover precisely which capacities play an
indispensable role in competent moral agency.
That neuroimaging could be used to help us
individually assess people’s responsibility in roughly
this manner is not a novel suggestion. For instance,
Walter Glannon writes that “functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) can display the structure
and function of the brain regions that regulate our
capacity for impulse control” ([17]:68), and he
suggests that an “fMRI image showing significantly
reduced metabolic activity in ... this part of the brain,
could excuse [a person] from [a] charge of responsi-
bility [o]n the basis ... that she lacked [a relevant]
5 I am working here under the assumption that our mental
capacities are implemented within our brains, though this
assumption might perhaps be challenged by (1) dualists, (2)
those who claim that other parts of the nervous system also play
an important role, and by (3) proponents of the extended mind
hypothesis.
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Yaling Yang summarize a growing body of empirical
data which shows significant structural and functional
differences between the brains of normals when
compared to the brains of “delinquent, criminal,
violent and psychopathic populations”, and towards
the end of their paper they suggest that although “[p]
sychopaths may not be...insane...if they lack the
capacity for the feeling of what is moral due to
neurobiological impairments beyond their control,
[then they might not be] fully responsible for their
criminal behavior” ([30]:211, emphasis removed).
The advantages of the neuroimaging approach to
the individualized assessment of people’s responsibil-
ity over the behavioural approaches outlined earlier
can be summarized briefly. Firstly, within this
approach there is no room for deceit and lies to spoil
the validity of our findings, because our findings do
not rely on anyone’s veracity—i.e. this approach can
not be fooled by someone who intentionally flunks
their moral judgment and self-control tests, and it
does not rely for its validity upon the accuracy of
other’s biographical accounts of the person whose
responsibility is in need of being individually
assessed. Secondly, to the extent that the mechanisms
present within our brains—i.e. the “hardware” of our
brains—determine our mental capacities,
6 and further,
to the extent that neuroimaging provides us with a
direct view of our brains,
7 the neuroimaging approach
enables us to directly view what mental capacities a
person really has, and so it is also immune to the
modal fallacy problem which plagues the described
behavioural approaches.
8
Some Problems Associated with the Neuroimaging
Approach
Naturally, nobody is implying that this promising
high-tech solution to the individualized assessment of
people’s responsibility is a “silver bullet” which will
answer all of our pertinent questions, or that it would
be completely free of problems.
For instance, Glannon mentions a long list of
caveats including: (1) not all people with brain
abnormalities commit crimes, and so we ought not
conclude in any given case that the brain abnormality
which is observed in a particular individual is what
caused them to commit their crime ([17]:77); (2) no
scan of the brain performed after the event can
establish with any degree of certainty what state that
person’sb r a i nw a si na tt h et i m ew h e nt h e y
committed the crime, and this temporal aspect may
also limit our ability to determine whether it is
legitimate to attribute responsibility to someone for a
crime which we know that they committed ([17]:80);
(3) fMRI images and images from other current
functional neuroimaging technologies are not direct
images of brain activity, but theory-laden representa-
tions of the outcomes of statistical analyses performed
upon data about metabolic activity in the brain
gathered in highly controlled settings when subjects
respond to often very artificial and carefully hand-
crafted questions ([17]:80–1);
9 and (4) that respon-
sibility is a normative notion “reflecting social
conventions and expectations about how people can
or should act” and not just empirical findings about a
6 I comment on some of the limitations behind this assumption
in note 5 above.
7 I discuss this point in detail below—see note 9 and the
surrounding text as well as the section below entitled “Brief
Replies to the Problems Identified in the Previous Section”.
8 I discuss a complication with this last point—a complication
that applies to the use of functional neuroimaging technology in
this context—in the section below entitled “The Modal Fallacy
and Functional Neuroimaging”.
9 An fMRI scan is by no means a direct image of neural
activity since it only reveals the blood oxygenation level
changes in the brain, and so inferences must be made from
observations about blood oxygenation changes to claims about
which parts of the brain are being used, but yet a great many
assumptions need to be granted in order for these inferences to
be accepted. Furthermore, fMRI images reveal areas of the
brain which are associated with the performance of that task;
but although the association might be that those parts of the
brain comprise/implement (partly or fully) the respective
function or that in some other way they support that function,
it might also be that those parts of the brain activate as a
consequence (i.e. as effects rather than as causes or constitu-
ents) of the performance of that function. These same points
and many others—i.e. all cautioning us about the fact that
modern neuroimaging techniques are still in their infancy, that
they are still an inexact science, and hence that we must
exercise a healthy degree of scepticism or at least caution
about what conclusions we draw from the data gathered using
these techniques—are also made elsewhere (for instance,
see [31–34]).
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expect neuroimaging to provide answers to all of the
relevant questions which must be answered in order to
ascertain a person’s responsibility ([17]:80–1). On the
other hand, Raine and Yang point out that our
“understanding of the neural basis to moral decision-
making is clearly still in its infancy”, and that “social
risk factors” must surely also play a role in disposing
individuals to certain types of behaviour ([30]:211)—
i.e. they too are reserved about just how much
neuroimaging can revolutionize individualized assess-
ments of responsibility.
Similar comments and related concerns about the
extent to which neuroimaging can revolutionize
individualized assessments of responsibility are also
voiced by others, or else they are implied by what
they have to say. For instance, like Glannon, Stephen
Morse also points out that responsibility attributions
depend at least as much on “normative moral,
political, social and ultimately legal constitutional
question[s] about which behavioral science and
neuroscience must...fall silent” ([18]:48), as they do
on empirical facts about people’s brains. For instance,
he argues that only the law may say precisely what
threshold of capacity is sufficient for a person to pass
the “minimal rationality” test and thus to be deemed a
responsible agent; and relatedly, that only it may
determine how much compulsion is too much for
anyone to bear, and hence that it is a matter for those
working in the legal profession and not for neuro-
scientists to decide how much compulsion must be
present before a person’s responsibility becomes
compromised ([18]:38). Furthermore, as regards met-
ing out punishment to those who have already been
deemed responsible for some state of affairs, this too
is at least partially a normative issue because only the
law is in a position to determine what is and what is
not an appropriate level of punishment for a given
criminal violation—for instance, whether the appro-
priate retributive punishment for a given offence
should be some harsh words, a slap on the wrist, a
fine, imprisonment, ten lashes of the whip, twenty
lashes, or maybe even execution. On Morse’s ac-
count, the law’s responsibility practices are about
norm-setting and not just about fact-finding, and this
is an important reason why neuroimaging can’t
answer all of the relevant questions that must be
answered in order to determine the extent of some-
one’s responsibility for something that they have
done.
10
The list of doubts and problems that limit the
extent to which modern neuroimaging techniques can
revolutionize how we individually assess people’s
responsibility does not end here. Firstly, given neural
plasticity—i.e. the fact that the same function might
be implemented in different people’sb r a i n si n
radically different ways
11—we should not conclude
too hastily that someone lacks particular capacities
just because they lack the related brain mechanism(s)
since those capacities may be implemented in their
brain in a very different way to what we expect.
Secondly, as I point out elsewhere ([19]:202),
although brain scans may reveal that someone lacks
a capacity which is required for responsible moral
agency, if we have reason to believe that they are
responsible for that incapacity
12 then the mere fact
that they now have this incapacity will not necessarily
exculpate them. For instance, a drunk driver who
causes a car accident can not excuse themselves by
citing the fact that they lacked the capacity to drive
safely and hence that it was unreasonable for us to
10 In general Morse seems to be very skeptical about the
relevance of neuroscience to the law’s responsibility practices. In
fact, at one point he even “contends that neuroscience is largely
irrelevant” to how the law arrives at its decisions concerning
“responsibility ascriptions and just punishment” ([18]:34, empha-
sis added). I take it that Morse’s point here is not just descriptive
but also normative—i.e. that he is not merely describing what the
law currently does (e.g. that neuroimaging still plays a relatively
minor role within the law’s responsibility practices), but that on
his account the law need not alter its practices in light of what the
cognitive neurosciences are revealing about the human mind. I
will not address Morse’s general scepticism about the relevance of
neuroscience to the law’s responsibility practices here, other than
to point out that many of the things which he says show not that
neuroscience is irrelevant, but rather that it simply can’ta n s w e ra l l
of the questions.
11 Glannon cites the case of a female patient who, while
possessing only a quarter of the cerebral cortex, still never the
less possessed “no significant cognitive deficit” ([17]:79); what
we have here is someone whose brain was significantly
different to other people’s brains—missing three quarters of
the cerebral cortex is a significant difference on any account—
but yet she did not lack the usual mental capacities.
12 In what follows I mention just one way in which someone
might come to be responsible for their incapacity—namely, by
doing something that temporarily or permanently diminishes
their capacities (e.g. getting drunk)—however there may be
other ways too—for instance, someone might be responsible for
their incapacity if they negligently fail to develop it.
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this incapacity. Rather, since they are responsible for
their own incapacity, we would normally think that
they are therefore not entitled to cite that incapacity as
an exculpating factor, and in fact we may even think
worse of them for doing something that jeopardized
their capacity to be a responsible agent. Thus, if
someone is responsible for their current incapacity,
then the mere fact that they now have this incapacity
will not necessarily exculpate them, since usually
only incapacities for which we are not responsible can
play this exculpatory role.
Thirdly, and relatedly, although a neuroimaging
scan may reveal that a person lacks some responsibil-
ity-relevant mental capacity, the mere fact that they
have this incapacity will not necessarily exculpate
them if we have good reason to suppose that they
should have avoided putting themselves in a situation
where their incapacity would pose a problem. For
instance, although a driver that runs over a pedestrian
as a consequence of the sudden onset of an epileptic fit
may have had little if any control over their car once
their epileptic fit came on, they may still never the less
be responsible for the injuries and for damage that they
cause if we have good reason to suppose that they
ought not to have sat behind the steering wheel of their
car in the first place ([32]:316; [35]).
13 Whether it is or
whether it is not reasonable for such people to drive
cars depends on a great may things,
14 however this
should not distract us at present because the point that
is currently being made is only that the mere fact that
someone lacks a given capacity need not necessarily
exculpate that person, especially when they knew
about their incapacity and when they could reasonably
have been expected to take the necessary measures to
prevent that incapacity from becoming a problem.
A final reason why we may not be prepared to
excuse a person for something that they have done,
even though they only did it because of their lack of
some important responsibility-relevant mental capacity,
is because their lack of that capacity may be seen as
evidence for their badness and thus for their even
greater culpability, rather than as evidence for their
madness and thus for their reduced responsibility. For
instance, Marga Reimer [37] points out that evidence
from neuroimaging studies which reveals the under-
pinnings of psychopathy—for instance, James Blair’s
[38, 39] data which show that psychopaths’ amygdala
function very differently to the amygdala of non-
psychopaths—is compatible with two radically differ-
ent interpretations each of which has completely
opposite ramifications for our assessment of psycho-
paths’ responsibility. On one interpretation, the fact
that psychopaths’ amygdala function differently to
normal people’s amygdala (and hence that perhaps on
account of this different functional profile they lack the
capacity to truly realize that hurting people is wrong) is
evidence for their madness—i.e. that they suffer from a
kind of mental deficit, disorder or illness which
exculpates them of their responsibility. However, on
another interpretation such scans provide conclusive
evidence for the psychopath’s badness—for instance,
we might imagine someone saying something like this:
“Just look at those scans! See? It’sn ow o n d e rt h a t
psychopaths act like that. Their brains are wired-up to
not respond to other people’s distress. At the most
basic level they are wired-up to be wicked individuals
who do not care about others.” Now, Reimer’sp o i n ti s
not that the latter interpretation is preferable to the
former, but simply that such data is neutral between
these two interpretations (e.g. [37]:188, 191–2). How-
ever, this seems to be precisely the crux of Heidi
Maibom’s objection to the use of neuroimaging
evidence in the service of exonerating psychopaths
(and presumably others who have similarly reduced
responsibility-relevant capacities) of their responsibility
when she writes that “we cannot...simply excuse
people for being bad” ([40]:168). Maibom’s point here
seems to be that the fact that someone lacks a capacity
which is required for responsible moral agency is not a
reason to exculpate them, but quite to the contrary it is
rather a reason to damn them even harder, since with
such neuroimaging data at hand we now have
conclusive evidence that they are bad people.
13 Stephen Morse runs a similar argument when he asks us to
consider a person who is prone to explode in uncontrollable and
violent fits of rage whenever they think that someone else is
looking at them the wrong way—of such a person Morse says
the following: “If you know you’re like that, maybe you better
not go to bars” [36].
14 Itisconceivablethatinsome situations a person may be morally
justified in exposing other road users to the risk that they will
suffer a sudden epileptic fit and cause a road accident to occur—
for instance, perhaps this might be the case if the risk of the onset
of an epileptic fit is sufficiently small, if the cost of not driving on
this occasion is too large (e.g. they need to drive their mortally
sick child to hospital), and if no better options are available.
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in the Previous Section
The previous section listed ten worries and problems
with the suggestion that neuroimaging can help us to
individually assess people’s responsibility: (1) that not
all people with abnormal brains commit crimes; (2)
that our understanding of how the human brain works
is still very rudimentary; (3) that brain plasticity might
make it difficult to diagnose who has which capaci-
ties; (4) that methodological and technological prob-
lems with current neuroimaging techniques cast doubt
over the usefulness of neuroimaging data; (5) that we
can’t go back in time and check what capacities a
person had at the time when they committed their
crime; (6) that neuroimaging evidence for a person’s
incapacity may actually damn them even harder rather
than exculpating them; (7) that social factors, and not
just neurological impairments, also play some role in
determining our behaviour; (8) that responsibility
assessments also depend in part on normative
assumptions which are at least partially independent
of what cognitive neuroscience tells us about the
human mind; (9) that people might be responsible for
their own incapacity and thus that they might be
responsible for what they do on account of that; and
(10) that people who know about their own incapac-
ities may be responsible for what they do if they fail
to avoid situations in which those incapacities may
become a problem.
This is not a trivial list of problems. However, at
the same time I do not think that any of them are
show-stoppers either, since in time some of these
problems will be overcome through scientific and
technological advancements, and others apply equally
to the behavioural approach which was discussed
above and hence such problems can not provide us
with a reason to prefer the behavioural approach over
the neuroimaging approach—i.e. we will not be any
further behind if we adopt the neuroimaging approach
than if we only used the behavioural approach.
15 For
instance, the first three items will hopefully disappear
off this list once we gain a better understanding of
how the human brain works, and in any case given
the brain-based causes of human behaviour, there is
good reason to suppose that in the long term among
the best scientific explanations for human behaviour
will indeed be those that are informed by research
from the field of cognitive neuroscience (e.g.
[41]:61). As regards the fourth item, although current
neuroimaging techniques are still in their infancy,
given the track record of science and technology—i.e.
their steady advancement—we can probably safely
assume that better techniques will eventually come
along which will not suffer from these deficiencies.
The fifth item afflicts the neuroimaging approach to no
greater an extent than it afflicts the behavioural
approach—i.e. those who wish to assess a person’s
responsibility through behavioural tests also can’tg o
back in time to check what state that person’s brain was
in at the precise moment at which they committed the
crime—and so this is not a specific problem with the
neuroimagingapproach.Andinadditiontothefactthat
the last four items on this list also apply equally to the
behavioural approach as they do to the neuroimaging
approach, these items are merely a more detailed re-
statement of a claim which I have repeatedly made
throughout this essay and which I do not contest—
namely, that responsibility does not just hinge on
mental capacities; however, contrary to what Morse
has to say on this matter (see note 10 above), this
does not entail that neuroimaging is irrelevant to
responsibility assessments, but only that neuroimag-
ing evidence has limited utility (i.e. it only solves part
of the puzzle) since other considerations also impact
on our assessments of people’s responsibility.
This only leaves the sixth item on the list—i.e.
Maibom’s claim that neuroimaging data which shows
that someone lacks a responsibility-relevant capacity
actually damns that person even further rather than
exculpating them, since on her account such data
conclusively shows that this person is bad! However,
strictly speaking this is not really a critique of the
neuroscientific approach per se, but it is rather an
instance of a broader concern with all capacitarian
theories of responsibility. Any approach which claims
to have found a way of revealing people’s mental
capacities (irrespective of whether it claims to do this
by using behavioural tests or by using neuroimaging
data), and that by doing this it can help us establish
15 Perhaps if the neuroimaging approach was more prone to
suffering from these problems than the behavioural approach,
or if these problems could be dealt with more easily in the
context of the behavioural approach than in the context of the
neuroimaging approach, then citing such problems could
provide reasons to prefer the behavioural approach over the
neuroimaging approach, however I see no reason to think that
this is so.
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Maibom’s objection because that approach will have
taken it for granted that responsibility is in part a
matter of what capacities a person has. But since
Maibom’s objection targets all theories which hold
that a person’s responsibility depends in part upon
their mental capacities, and not just my own conten-
tion that neuroimaging could be used to help us assess
a person’s responsibility by helping to reveal their
mental capacities, I will therefore set aside the task of
defending the broader capacitarian approach.
16
This section’s discussion was intended to quickly
ward off some common doubts about whether neuro-
imaging can help us to individually assess people’s
responsibility. As I said at the beginning of the
previous section, nobody is implying that this promis-
ing high-tech solution to the individualized assessment
of people’sr e s p o n s i b i l i t yi sa“silver bullet” which will
answer all of our pertinent questions, or that it is
completely free of problems. However, the problems
which afflict it are (or at least they promise to be in the
medium to longer term) no greater than the problems
which afflict the behavioural approach, and yet it
manages to overcome some serious problems which
afflict the behavioural approach and for this reason I
do not think that we should give up yet on the idea
of using neuroimaging to help us assess people’s
responsibility.
The Modal Fallacy and Functional Neuroimaging
Up to this point I have painted a generally positive
picture of how neuroimaging could improve our
ability to accurately assess people’s responsibility,
but there is still one further worry that needs to be
addressed. It is a worry that applies specifically to
functional (as opposed to structural) neuroimaging,
and it will remain relevant even in the future once our
science and technology have advanced beyond their
present point, and so in this section I will focus first
on describing this worry, and then on showing how it
too can be dealt with.
A Question
Let me begin with the following question: could a
functional scan of a person’s brain help us assess that
person’s responsibility? For instance, could a set of
images which conclusively show significantly re-
duced function in parts of the brain that undeniably
play an indispensable role in underwriting the
capacity for sound moral judgment perform this
exonerating function?
Several of the authors whom I cited earlier and
indeed some others offer a positive answer to this
question. For instance, in the previously cited
passage Glannon expresses the belief that data
obtained from functional neuroimaging could ex-
cuse a person of responsibility by showing that they
lacked a responsibility-relevant capacity. Raine and
Yang’s previously cited comments about the respon-
sibility of delinquent, criminal, violent and psycho-
pathic populations were also informed in part by data
obtained from functional neuroimaging studies. Sim-
ilarly, James Blair’s ruminations about psychopaths’
responsibility are also derived from functional neuro-
imaging data; for instance, data obtained from
functional neuroimaging studies is the basis of his
claim that the capacity for intention is undermined in
the psychopath because of an “increased risk for
reactive aggression” ([39]:153), and that is obviously
also the case in his claim that “[t]he amygdala and
vmPFC dysfunction ... will seriously impair the
decision making in psychopathy” ([39]:154, emphasis
added).
17 Finally, the idea that functional neuroimag-
ing might be capable of revealing people’s reduced-
responsibility is also evident in Claudia Pinto’s article
about the man who “was a schoolteacher, a husband,
a father[, and t]hen he became a pedophile preoccu-
pied with sex” in which she writes that “murderers, as
a group, had lower glucose metabolism in the
16 In fact the capacitarian approach is defended by others. For
instance, the views of such authors as John Martin Fischer &
Mark Ravizza, Daniel Dennett, Susan Wolf and Patricia Smith-
Churchland (all cited earlier in this essay) are all capacitarian in
the right sense since each (using their own terminology) sees
responsibility as a matter of whether the agent has the capacity
to guide their actions in the right manner (e.g. in light of right
reasons) rather than for instance as a matter of the metaphysical
freedom from being determined by causality (e.g. [42]). On
their accounts the fact that someone lacks this sort of capacity
can exculpate them rather than showing that they are bad.
17 Blair’s claim that “[t]wo important capacities are necessary
for successful [moral] socialization. First, the individual must
be capable of finding the distress of others aversive….Second,
the individual must be capable of performing stimulus-
reinforcement learning”, commits him to a capacitarian account
of the conditions of responsibility ([38]:327).
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brain areas which normally function to inhibit
aggressive impulses” [43].
A range of people think that functional neuro-
imaging could in principle be used to help us assess a
person’s responsibility by revealing their mental
capacities.
The Worry
However, it could be argued that a modal fallacy
similar to the one that was described earlier might
also be committed if functional neuroimaging is used
to assess people’s capacities.
18 To see how this might
happen, consider the following example. Suppose,
that we are trying to establish whether Jane and John
are capable of (i.e. whether they have the capacity
for) doing maths, and to simplify matters suppose also
that mathematical ability in people who have it is
implemented in a single part of the brain called
Brodmann Area Maths (BAM).
19 We put Jane and
John into fMRI scanners, present each with a number
of equations, and ask them to determine whether
those equations are correct or not. Now, as it happens,
Jane was never taught maths, and so although she is
enthusiastic she ultimately performs badly—Jane
never developed the brain mechanisms which one
needs to have in order to understand let alone to do
maths (her BAM does not have a capacity to do
maths), and so the fMRI scan shows below-average
activation in her BAM. On the other hand, John
teaches graduate courses in maths at Big State
University, but today he is feeling unmotivated, and
so he only pretends to assess the equations while
actually thinking about something else—John does
not use his BAM, and so not surprisingly the fMRI
images of John’s brain look similar to those of Jane’s
brain. However, although the fMRI scans reveal
below-average levels of activation in both Jane and
in John’s BAM, this surely should not be taken as
evidence that both of them lack the capacity to do
maths, since ex hypothesi we know that John does
have the capacity to do maths but it’s just that he
wasn’t exercising that capacity when we scanned his
brain!
20
Coming back to the case at hand, even if we noted
that the brains of people who consistently perform
badly in various moral judgment tasks also show
consistently reduced patterns of activation in some
area of the brain that would normally be used by
subjects who perform well in those tasks—for
instance, in “the amygdala and rostral anterior
cingulate cortex/vmPFC” ([39]:151)—why should
we suppose that this reveals an incapacity (i.e. that
those parts of their brain can not function at higher
levels of activation) rather than merely showing that
those people do not use a capacity which, for all we
know, they might actually possess? How could we
distinguish whether such people are more like Jane
who non-culpably
21 lacks the capacity for maths (i.e.
18 To recap, one commits a modal fallacy when one moves
from an observation of the form “X doesn’t happen” (i.e. an
observation about behaviour) to a conclusion of the form “X
can’t happen” (a claim about capacity), and I argued above that
this is precisely the sort of move which is made within the
behavioural approach because claims about people’s incapaci-
ties are derived from observations about what sorts of
behaviour they do not exhibit. However, I then argued that by
using the neuroimaging approach we could avoid committing a
modal fallacy since here claims about people’s capacities are
derived from observations of their brain mechanisms.
19 In actual fact, no single area of the brain is associated with
mathematical reasoning, but rather a number of different areas
have been implicated including the “angular gyrus, left parietal
and prefrontal cortex” ([44]:168). This is due to the fact that
there seems to be at least two different kinds of mathematical
reasoning: “Exact arithmetic puts emphasis on language-
specific representations and relies on a left inferior frontal
circuit also used for generating associations between words....
Approximate arithmetic, in contrast, shows no dependence on
language and relies primarily on a quantity representation
implemented in visuo-spatial networks of the left and right
parietal lobes” ([45]:973, emphasis added). Never the less, to
simplify this example, I talk as if there were just one area of the
brain—namely, the fictional Brodmann Area Maths (BAM)—
that is the seat of mathematical ability.
20 In this example I am working under the simplifying
assumption that with greater exertion of mathematical skill
come higher levels of BAM activation, and that with lesser
exertions come lower levels of BAM activation. But as a person
studies more maths, the connections between the neurons in
their BAM might become optimised through dendritic pruning,
and this may result in increasingly lower levels of activation in
their BAM the more proficient they become at doing maths.
However, I could have made the same point while assuming
that there is an inverse (or some other more complex)
relationship between skilled exercise of mathematical ability
and BAM activation levels, and so I ask the reader to bear with
this assumption. I am grateful to Jonathan Opie from the
University of Adelaide for pointing this out to me.
21 The point of the “non-culpably” clause is to cut short the
potential objection that perhaps these people are responsible for
their incapacity.
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correctly assess moral judgment tasks), or whether
they are more like John (perhaps they are lazy,...
perhaps they just do not put in the same effort as the
rest of us do to figure out what is the right thing to do
in various situations)?
22 The point is that if functional
neuroimaging was our exclusive tool of choice then
we could not distinguish someone who possessed a
capacity but failed to use it from someone who simply
lacked that capacity altogether. As Walter Glannon
points out, just like “[b]ehavioral criteria ... do not ...
help us to distinguish between having some ...
capacity and failing to exercise it ... and lacking the
capacity [altogether, s]imilar remarks apply to brain
imaging studies” ([46]:161).
The source of this problem is that by definition, a
functional neuroimaging scan is only designed to
reveal parts of the brain which are used in the
performance of a particular cognitive task, and so
we should not expect to find any differences in the
scans of those people who lack a given capacity and
that is why they do not use it and those who possess
that capacity but never the less do not use it, because
in both cases the area of the brain associated with that
capacity will not get used. Although structural scans
of their respective brains may indeed look different—
they might for instance reveal that one person
possesses the requisite brain mechanisms whereas
the other person does not—we should not expect
functional scans to look any different. Unlike struc-
tural neuroimaging which reveals the mechanisms or
“hardware” in which a person’s capacities are imple-
mented, functional neuroimaging reveals only which
parts of the brain a person was using when they
allegedly attempted to perform a particular cognitive
task. However, this means that when conclusions about
ap e r s o n ’s capacities are derived from a functional scan
of their brain, then those conclusions will still be
derived from observations about behaviour—brain
behaviour—and so it would seem that when functional
neuroimaging data is used to support claims about
capacities then a modal fallacy will after all be
committed!
Finally, it is important to note that this worry does
not just attach to current functional neuroimaging
techniques, but rather it will attach even to future
functional neuroimaging technology; if the future
technology reveals only functional data then accord-
ing to the above arguments one will have to commit a
modal fallacy in order to derive claims about
capacities from that data. Thus, what is it that justifies
the transition from the observation (obtained through
a functional neuroimaging scan) that some part of a
person’s brain consistently shows lower-than-average
levels of activation (i.e. reduced function) to the claim
that this part of their brain can not (i.e. that it lacks the
capacity to) operate at higher levels of activation?
The Solutions
The transition that is made when functional neuro-
imaging data is cited to support claims about people’s
capacities is an inference from an observation about
behaviour (in this case brain behaviour) to a conclu-
sion about capacities (how that brain can not behave),
and the worry described above is that this inference is
not justified. However, I think that there are at least
two ways to justify this transition and thus to show
that this inference is warranted after all—one to do
with automatic responses, and the other to do with
theories to the best explanation—which deflect the
worry that a modal fallacy is committed when this
inference is made, and I will now say something
about each of these justifications.
Automatic Responses
23
The first justification looks something like this.
If the areas of the brain in which some part of the
capacity for sound moral judgment is normally
implemented—e.g. the amygdale—are ones which
are meant to activate automatically whenever subjects
are exposed to certain kinds of stimuli (e.g. when they 22 Exactly the same question could be asked with respect to
claims about volitional capacities that are derived from
functional neuroimaging data, except here we would ask
something like “How could we distinguish whether such people
are more like Jane (i.e. perhaps they too lack the capacity to
control their angry impulses), or whether they are in fact more
like John (perhaps they are just lazy and they just do not put in
the same effort as the rest of us do to restrain ourselves)?”
23 I am grateful to Philip Gerrans from the University of
Adelaide for pointing out this justification for deriving
conclusions about capacity from observations about consistent-
ly reduced function.
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they hear emotionally charged words), then we could
legitimately surmise that a person indeed has reduced
capacity for sound moral judgment if those parts of
their brain consistently show reduced levels of
activation when they are presented with the right
kind of stimuli. A similar move is made in the
diagnosis of “cortical visual impairment”, where the
consistent lack of activity in a person’s occipital lobe
when they are presented with appropriate visual
stimuli can be taken as evidence that this part of their
brain lacks the capacity to process visual informa-
tion.
24 Hence, similarly, if the capacity for sound
moral judgment also requires some automatic
responses in certain areas of the brain when subjects
are exposed to the right kinds of stimuli, then when
we consistently observe a significantly reduced level
of activation in those areas of the brain upon exposure
to those stimuli, we should also be entitled to
conclude that this person has reduced capacity for
sound moral judgment.
25
And indeed, it has been argued that there are
certain automatic responses that can be observed
when normal subjects are exposed to moral cognition
inducing stimuli and which are required for sound
moral judgment. For instance, when normal subjects
are presented with pictures of fearful or sad faces,
they automatically show an elevated skin conductance
response [49] and increased activity in their amygdala
[39], and it is hypothesized that both of these
automatic responses (and a horde of others) are
required for sound moral judgment [26]; without
these automatic responses subjects either fail to
perceive important moral cues, or they simply fail to
engage in the right kind of cognitive processing, and
hence such people’s moral judgments can indeed fail
to be sound.
26
Thus, the first sort of case in which we will be
justified in drawing a conclusion about reduced
capacity from an observation about consistently
reduced levels of neural activation, is when the
missing activation was meant to be an automatic
response to the given stimuli. Put another way, if
exposure to the given stimuli should always raise the
level of activation in a specific area of every subject’s
brain, but yet that area of this subject’s brain did not
show that response despite the fact that they were
presented with the right stimuli, then we may
justifiably conclude (i.e. without committing a modal
fallacy) that a mechanism which normally generates
an automatic response is broken and hence that the
subject does indeed have a reduced capacity to
respond in the given manner.
Theory to the Best Explanation
27
The derivation of claims about reduced capacity from
functional neuroimaging data can also be justified in
another way.
If my car consistently fails to start on cold
mornings but yet on warm mornings it starts without
any noticeable problems, then I will start to suspect
that there is something mechanically wrong with it—
for instance, that the spark plugs are worn out and that
on cold mornings when metal warps the gap between
the spark plugs’ electrodes becomes too large for the
electricity to successfully arc across them and to
ignite the petrol in the engine’s cylinders. Similarly, if
buses consistently run late on Monday mornings then
I will start to suspect that there is something about how
people behave on the first day of the working week
that causes this phenomenon—for instance, that con-
gestion is caused when everyone turns up at the same
time on the roads, at bus and tram stops and at train
stations, and that this congestion slows everything
down. In both of these cases, my observation of some
consistent anomaly leads me to posit the existence of
some as-yet-unobserved mechanism that explains the
observed phenomenon, and once I have this mecha-
nism I will then be able to validly deduce some further
claims about capacities—for instance, about my car’s
reduced capacity to start on cold mornings, and about
24 For discussion of the use of functional neuroimaging
techniques in the diagnosis of cortical visual impairment, see
Isaac Silverman et al. [47] who used hexamethylpropylene
amine oxime in their SPECT studies to obtain functional data,
or William Good et al. [48] who suggest that fMRI might also
be used to obtain such functional data.
25 Though please note my comments in note 19 above.
26 Also see Glannon’s useful summary of relevant empirical
findings ([46]:159–60).
27 I am grateful to Gert-Jan Lokhorst of TU Delft for suggesting
this second justification for deriving conclusions about capacity
from observations about consistently reduced activation.
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on time on Monday mornings.
I think that something analogous also happens in
the case at hand, where the claim that someone lacks
the capacity for sound moral judgment (or some
necessary constituent of that capacity) is also intended
as an inference to the best explanation—i.e. the
observation of a consistently reduced level of activity
in a certain part of that person’s brain when that
person is exposed to stimuli which should have led to
an increased level of activation leads us to hypothe-
size that there must be some as-yet-unobserved
structural anomaly in their brain which explains the
consistently observed lower level of activity, and
since no modal fallacy is committed when claims
about reduced capacity are derived from claims about
structure—it doesn’t take much to imagine how a lack
of the appropriate brain mechanism may result in a
lack of the related capacities—similarly, no modal
fallacy will be committed when claims about capac-
ities are derived from such hypotheses about structur-
al abnormalities. Put another way, a transition seems
to be made in the case at hand from an observation
about the functional profile of the person’s brain
(derived from a functional neuroimaging scan) to a
hypothesis about the structural features of their brain,
and the claim about reduced capacity is then derived
from the claim about this hypothesized structural
anomaly and not directly from the functional data.
Naturally, another objection may now be raised—
namely, that the claim about the person’s reduced
capacity is now derived from something that is only
postulated to exist but which has not yet been shown
to exist—however this is not the same as the modal
fallacy problem.
Hence, in the second instance, the transition from
the observation of a consistently reduced level of
activation in some part of a person’s brain to the claim
that this person has a reduced capacity for sound
moral judgment, can also be justified as an attempt to
offer the best available explanation for the observed
phenomenon. The “best explanation for the low brain
activity as measured functionally is that there is a
structural anomaly that accounts for the [observed]
functional problem”,
28 and no modal fallacy is
committed when conclusions about incapacity are
deduced from claims about structural features of the
brain.
Section Summary
Thus, there are two ways to derive claims about
reduced capacity from functional neuroimaging data
without committing a modal fallacy. Firstly, no modal
fallacy will be committed if the activity that is
missing was meant to be an automatic response to
some specific stimuli. Secondly, if the claim about
reduced capacity is derived not directly from the
functional neuroimaging data itself, but rather indi-
rectly from a hypothesis about some as yet un-
observed structural anomalies—a hypothesis which
explains that functional data—then again no modal
fallacy will be committed since claims about reduced
capacities can be derived from structural data without
committing a modal fallacy.
As an aside, similar replies to the modal fallacy
problem might also be available to proponents of the
behavioural approach to the individualized assess-
ment of responsibility.
29 For instance, if we have
good reason to believe that all people who possess the
capacity for sound moral judgment will always wince
whenever they see a photo of someone in a distressing
situation and that this is an involuntary response
which can not be consciously suppressed by the
subject who is being tested, then when we observe
someone who fails to exhibit this automatic response
we will also be justified in drawing the conclusion that
this subject has reduced capacity for making sound
moral judgments. Similarly, if proponents of the
behavioural approach can posit a plausible psycho-
logical mechanism which explains the observed lack
of some behaviour, and then derive their claims about
a specific person’s reduced cognitive or volitional
capacity from claims about this as-yet-unobserved
psychological mechanism, then that too may enable
them to avoid commiting a modal fallacy. However,
although this suggests that the modal fallacy
problem may not be as damaging to the behavioural
approach as I initially suggested (with support from
McSherry and Sapolsky), it does still mean that for
the behavioural approach to provide useful evidence
we must use more complex tests—i.e. ones which
28 I thank Eddy Nahmias of Georgia State University for this
helpful way of putting my point.
29 I thank the editor of Neuroethics for setting me straight on
this point.
Neuroimaging and responsibility assessments 47do not permit the subject whose responsibility is
being tested to intentionally interfere in the results—
and that we should not rely too heavily on
biographical data obtained from other’s stories about
the person whose responsibility is being assessed
since my original comments in this regard still stand.
Conclusion
In Roper v. Simmons [1] the Supreme Court of the
United States spared Simmons’ life when it ruled that
Simmons’ execution would be unconstitutional be-
cause “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders
who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were
committed”. Presumably, age matters to responsibility
because of its relationship to maturity, and maturity
matters to responsibility because usually with greater
maturity come greater mental capacities—of most
interest to us here, greater cognitive and volitional
capacities. However, people mature at different rates,
and so we oughtn’t rely on age to be an accurate
indicator of a person’s true capacities and of how
responsible they truly are. Given what hangs on
responsibility assessments—i.e. the type and degree
of punishment to which an accused person will be
subjected—such assessments should be as precise and
accurate as possible, and the way to get greater
precision and accuracy is to find a more individual-
ized way of assessing people’s responsibility, rather
than using a person’s age as a proxy for the degree of
their responsibility.
One way to individually assess people’s responsi-
bility is through what I referred to as the behavioural
approach. However, this approach may still be
dreadfully inaccurate if it relies on the veracity of
those who are being tested and on the veracity of
those who are asked to characterize that person, and
furthermore unless such behavioural approaches are
properly designed then they will run afoul of the
modal fallacy problem that was described above. For
these reasons we should at least supplement these
behavioural approaches to the individualized assess-
ment of responsibility with something else.
I have argued that neuroimaging offers us such a
supplement—a promising way to individually assess
people’s responsibility. Although neuroimaging is no
“silver bullet”—i.e. at best it only answers some of
the questions that need to be answered in order to
assess a person’s responsibility—and although it also
comes with its own suite of problems, never the less
in time some of those problems will most probably be
overcome, and the remainder of these problems is
also encountered by the behavioural approach. Thus,
given the foregoing arguments, it is now my
contention that in the future—i.e. once science and
technology have progressed sufficiently—neuroimag-
ing may indeed be helpful in this regard. Neuro-
imaging can free us of our current reliance upon such
rough-and-ready rules of thumb as the claim that a
person’s responsibility is in part determined by their
age—rules of thumb which carried the day in Roper v.
Simmons [1]—and given what is at stake for those
whose responsibility is currently assessed in this
manner and the fact that this rule of thumb is
ultimately inaccurate, this can only be a good thing.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are
credited.
References
1. Roper v. Simmons. 2005. Donald P. Roper, Superintendent,
Potosi Correctional Center, Petitioner v. Christopher
Simmons, http://laws.findlaw.com/us/543/551.html,
accessed 2009109.
2. Herndon, J., and S.P. Waxman. 2004. Brief for respondent in
Roper v Simmons [2005]. St. Louis, MO: i-xiv, 1-50, 1a-21a.
3. ABA-1. “Christopher Simmons-Juvenile Death Penalty”,
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons.html,
accessed 20081021.
4. Wikipedia. “Roper v. Simmons” http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Roper_v._Simmons, accessed 20081021.
5. Perry, S.R. 2000. Loss, agency, and responsibility for
outcomes: Three conceptions of corrective justice. In
Philosophy of law, eds. J. Feinberg, and J. Coleman,
6546–559. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning.
6. Hart, H.L.A. 1968. IX.Postscript:Responsibilityandretribution.
Punishment and responsibility. 210–237. Oxford: Clarendon.
7. Kutz, C. 2004. Chapter 14: Responsibility. In Jurisprudence
and philosophy of law, eds. J. Coleman, and S. Shapiro,
548–587. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Vincent, N. 2006. Responsibility, Compensation and
Accident Law Reform. Discipline of Philosophy, Faculty
of Humanities and Social Sciences. Adelaide: University of
Adelaide. Doctor of Philosophy http://digital.library.ade
laide.edu.au/dspace/handle/2440/39507.
9. Fischer, J.M., and M. Ravizza. 1998. Conclusion. In
Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility,
48 N.A. Vincenteds. J.M. Fischer, and M. Ravizza, 240–259. Cambridge:
CUP.
10. Dennett, D.C. 1998. On giving libertarians what they say
they want. In Philosophy then and now,e d s .N . S .A r n o l d ,
T.M. Benditt, and G. Graham, 119–130. Malden: Blackwell.
11. Wolf, S. 1987. Sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility.
In Responsibility, character and the emotions: New Essays
in moral psychology, ed. F. Shoeman, 46–62. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
12. Wolf, S. 2001. The reason view. In Agency and responsi-
bility: Essays on the metaphysics of freedom, ed. L.W.
Ekstrom, 205–226. Boulder: Westview.
13. Sapolsky, R.M. 2004. The frontal cortex and the criminal
justice system. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London 359: 1787–1796.
14. Roskies, A. 2006. Neuroscientific challenges to free will and
responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(9): 419–423.
15. Morse, S.J. 2006a. Brain overclaim syndrome and criminal
responsibility: A diagnostic note. Ohio State Journal of
Criminal Law 3: 397–412.
16. Churchland, P.S. 2006. The big questions: Do we have free
will. New Scientist 2578: 42–45. (18-Nov).
17. Glannon, W. 2005. Neurobiology, neuroimaging, and free
will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXIX: 68–82.
18. Morse, S.J. 2006b. Moral and legal responsibility and the
new neuroscience. In Neuroethics: Defining the issues in
theory, practice, and policy, ed. J. Illes, 33–50. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
19. Vincent, N. 2008. Responsibility, dysfunction and capacity.
Neuroethics 1(3): 199–204.
20. Levy, N. 2007. The Responsibility of the psychopath revisited.
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 14(2): 129–138.
21. Fischer, J.M. 2005. Reply: The free will revolution.
Philosophical Explorations 8(2): 145–156.
22. McKenna, M. 2000. Assessing reasons-responsive compa-
tibilism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8
(1): 89–124.
23. McKenna, M. 2001. Book review: Fischer and Ravizza’s
“Responsibility and control”. The Journal of Philosophy 98
(2): 93–100.
24. McKenna, M. 2005. Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist
intuitions. Philosophical Explorations 8(2): 131–143.
25. McSherry, B. 2004. Criminal responsibility, ‘Fleeting’states
of mental impairment, and the power of self-control.
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27: 224–257.
26. Greene, J., and J. Haidt. 2002. How (and where) does moral
judgment work.Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6(12): 517–523.
27. Gerrans, P., and J. Kennett. 2006. Introduction: Is cognitive
penetrability the mark of the moral. Philosophical Explo-
rations 9(1): 3–12.
28. Greene, J., L.E. Nystrom, et al. 2004. The neural bases of
cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron
44: 389–400.
29. Matthews, S. 2004. Failed agency and the insanity defence.
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27: 413–424.
30. Raine, A., and Y. Yang. 2006. Neural foundations to moral
reasoning and antisocial behavior. Social Cognitive and
Affective Neuroscience 1(3): 203–213.
31. Goodenough, O.R., and K. Prehn. 2004. A neuroscientific
approach to normative judgment in law and justice. In Law
& the brain, eds. S. Zeki, and O.R. GoodenoughNew York:
Oxford University Press.
32. Eastman, N., and C. Campbell. 2006. Neuroscience and
legal determination of criminal responsibility. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience 7: 311–318. (April).
33. Mobbs, D., H.C. Lau, et al. 2007. Law, responsibility, and
the brain. PLoS Biology 5(4): 693–700.
34. Logothetis, N.K. 2008. What we can do and what we
cannot do with fMRI. Nature 453: 869–878. (12 June
2008).
35. Tallis, R. 2007. Why blame me? It was all my brain’s
fault—The dubious rise of ‘neurolaw’. The Times, 24
October 2007.
36. Morse, S.J. 2004. (Thursday, 9th September 2004). Session
1: Neuroscience, Brain, and Behavior VI: Neuroscience
and the Law, from http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/
sep04/session1.html, accessed 200711128.
37. Reimer, M. 2008. Psychopathy without (the Language of)
Disorder. Neuroethics 1(3): 185–198.
38. Blair, R.J.R. 2007. Aggression, psychopathy and free will
from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. Behavioral
Sciences and the Law 25: 321–331.
39. Blair, R.J.R. 2008. The cognitive neuroscience of psychop-
athy and implications for judgments of responsibility.
Neuroethics 1(2): 149–157.
40. Maibom, H.L. 2008. The mad, the bad, and the psychopath.
Neuroethics 1(3): 167–184.
41. Jones, O.D. 2004. Law, evolution and the brain: Applica-
tions and open questions. In Law & the brain, eds. S. Zeki,
and O.R. Goodenough, 57–75. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
42. van Inwagen, P. 2001. The incompatibility of free will and
determinism. In Agency and responsibility: Essays on the
metaphysics of freedom, ed. L.W. Ekstrom, 17–29. Boulder:
Westview.
43. Pinto, C. 2003. Putting the brain on trial. Media General
News Service, http://www.rifters.com/real/articles/brainon
trial.htm, accessed 20080706.
44. Krendl, A.C., J.A. Richeson, et al. 2008. The negative
consequences of threat: A functional magnetic resonance
imaging investigation of the neural mechanisms underlying
women’s underperformance in math. Psychological Science
19(2): 168–175.
45. Dehaene, S., E. Spelke, et al. 1999. Sources of mathemat-
ical thinking: Behavioral and brain-imaging evidence.
Science 284: 970–974.
46. Glannon, W. 2008. Moral responsibility and the psycho-
path. Neuroethics 1(3): 158–166.
47. Silverman, I.E., S.L. Galetta, et al. 1993. SPECT in patients
with cortical visual loss. The Journal of Nuclear Medicine
34(9): 1447–1451.
48. Good, W.V., J.E. Jan, et al. 2001. Recent advances in
cortical visual impairment. Developmental Medicine &
Child Neurology 43(1): 56–60.
49. Damasio, A.R. 1995. Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason,
and the human brain. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
Neuroimaging and responsibility assessments 49